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STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24

2

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 12

2

vi

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(a)-3.
This is an appeal from a final Order in the Third District Court of Salt Lake Count). State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FINDING THAT APPELLEE WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS, NOR MAINTAINED
MINIMUM CONTACTS IN THE STATE OF UTAH, SUFFICIENT TO CONFER
GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FINDING THAT UTAH'S LONG ARM STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2724 (1996), DID NOT CONFER SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEE.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 Herhertson v. WilloMcreek Plaza. 895

1

As in Herhertson. here the trial court considered more than just the pleadings
making his determination and therefore, the ruling is best characterized as a grant of summary
judgment.
1

P.2d 839. 840 & n.l (Utah 1995). In reviewing a motion for summar} judgment, this court will
consider "all of the facts and evidence presented, and even reasonable inference arming therelrom.
in a light most favorable to the part} opposing the Motion."* Katzenherger r Stale. 735 P.2d 405.
408 (Utah 1987). Further, because summar} judgment presents only questions of law. this court
accords no deference to the trial court's ruling and reviews it for coiTectness. Mimiiord v ITT
Commercial Fin. Corp.. 858 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 1993).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

The following Statutes and Rules are determinative of the questions at issue in this appeal:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2):
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24:
Any person ... whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person
or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1)

the transaction of any business within this state; ...

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

2

Plaintiff Appellant Chris Buddensick brought this action in the Third Judicial District
Court to reco\ er compensation for injuries she sustained as a result of a slip and fall accident at the
StateLine Hotel and Casino in Wendover. Nevada. She filed a Complaint which was not answered
by Defendant/StateLine. Instead, StateLine filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds and for the
reason that Utah Courts lacked specific and general personal jurisdiction over its Hotel and Casino.
Defendant argued the District Court did not have jurisdiction under Utah's "Long Arm Statute".
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24, nor did the Court have general personal jurisdiction over StateLine
Hotel and Casino, as it was not "doing business" in Utah and did not have sufficient minimum
contacts with the State. Plaintiff argued that Defendants contacts with Utah, and the fact it was
doing business within the State, were sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Although the Court
found there were business contacts in Utah as outlined in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, the Court granted Defendant's Motion and dismissed this action finding there were not
sufficient minimum contacts nor was Defendant doing business, sufficient to confer specific and/or
general personal jurisdiction. (See Exhibit "C")

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND DISPOSITION

1.

On or about July 29, 1996, Appellant was in Defendants' StateLine Casino buffet

restaurant for the purpose of eating a meal. StateLine employees had completed preparing the buffet
and had just opened it for the public. Appellant was the second or third person in line at the buffet.
Appellant, while proceeding through the buffet line, slipped on a substance that was on the floor,
causing Appellant to fall.
3

2.

As a result of the accident on July 29. 1996. Ms. Buddensick suffered serious

personal injuries which required extensive medical care.
3.

On January 17. 1997, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court

of Salt Lake County. (R. 1-4)
4.

On March 17, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based on

lack of jurisdiction. (R. 14-16)
5.

On June 30, 1997, a hearing was held before Judge William A. Thorne to argue

Defendant's Motion. The Court granted an evidentiary hearing to take place after discover}* had
been completed on the limited issue of StateLine's business activities in Utah. (R. 269)
6.

Discovery revealed that Defendant advertises its hotel and casino in Utah; contracts

for goods and services in Utah; owns stock in a Utah Corporation, StateLine Properties, Inc.: leases
from StateLine Properties, and has leased for many years, two parcels of property in Utah foi parking
lot. parking structure and signage purposes, relating to Defendant's hotel and casino business; leases
and has leased for many years, at least three other parcels located in Utah; maintains at least three
post office boxes in Utah, one of which Defendant shares with StateLine Properties; is a party to
numerous other lawsuits pending in Utah; has a Utah cellular telephone number, regular phone
number and six Utah fax numbers.
7.

Nearly every agreement entered into by Defendant, including the leases and contracts

noted above, show that they were executed and notarized in Salt Lake City, Utah. The documents
were also drafted by a Utah attorney.
8.

On September 15, 1997, the evidentiary hearing was held with Honorable William

A. Thorne to argue Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint. (R. 270)
4

9.

On October 8. 1997. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order was entered

in this matter b\ Judge Thorne dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. (R. 247-252)
10.

On October 22. 1997. Plaintiff Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal in the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 253-254)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks the reversal of the trial court's ruling dismissing Appellant's complaint for
lack of general and specific jurisdiction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's Complaint, because StateLine has

engaged in substantial and continuous local activity, and in doing so, should have reasonably
expected to be hailed into a Utah Court, thus creating general personal jurisdiction.
11.

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant's Complaint for lack of specific personal

jurisdiction. Appellant went to the Appellees' premises due to Appellees' advertising activities in
the State of Utah. Therefore, the injuries Appellant suffered were the result of Appellees' contacts
with Utah and Utah's Long Arm Statute Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-24 confers jurisdiction over
Appellees.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR,
IN FINDING THAT APPELLEE WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS, NOR
MAINTAINED MINIMUM CONTACTS IN THE STATE OF UTAH,
SUFFICIENT TO CONFER GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
When a motion for lack of jurisdiction is submitted, a Plaintiff need only make a prima facie
showing to establish jurisdiction over a Defendant.

Neways. Inc. v. McCauglan. 950 P.2d 420

(Utah 1997). Here, more than a prima facie showing was made by Plaintiff.
"General personal jurisdiction over a party results when the party has contacts in the forum
state and those contacts are 'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic."" Alexander v. Circus
Circus Enter.. Inc. 939 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks.
Ltd.. 796 F.2d 299,301 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Haisten v. Grass Vallev Med. Reimbursement Fund.
784 F.2d 1392,1396 (9th Cir. 1986))): see also Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft Corp.. 578 P.2d
850, 853 n.6. (Utah 1978).2
At the evidentiary hearing before the trial court, Plaintiff made a clear showing that
Defendant transacts sufficient and indeed substantial business in the State of Utah and/or there are
other grounds for the Court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (See Exhibit

2

The Utah Supreme Court in Abbott distinguished between general personal
jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. The court explained that general personal
jurisdiction results from doing business, which required substantial and continuous activity
Abbott. 578 P.2d at 853 n.6.
6

1.

During pertinent periods. Defendant contracted with at least two Utah corporations:
(a)

A June 1. 1996 contract with American Linen of Salt Lake Cit\. L'tah: (R.

(b)

August 19, 1996 with Retail Control Systems of Salt Lake City. Utah for

111-112)

maintenance of its "register equipment". (R. 113)
2.

The Defendant Nevada Corporation also leases, occupies and possesses the following

parcels of real property in the state of Utah:
(a)

Property covered by an August 1, 1996 Lease by and between StateLine

Properties, Inc. as landlord and Defendant as tenant covering certain property described in the
document attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion.
(R. 114-118)
(b)

A duplex located in Wendover, Tooele County, Utah, covered by a Lease and

extension thereof by and between StateLine Properties as lessor and Defendant as lessee. A copy
of this Lease is attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion. (R. 119-120)
(c)

A Lease and extension thereof covering two warehouse buildings situated in

Wendover, Tooele County, Utah, by and between StateLine Properties as lessor and Defendant, as
lessee. A copy of said Lease is attached to Plaintiff/Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 121-122)
(d)

A Lease covering a parking structure and land by and between StateLine

Properties, Inc., as lessor and StateLine Hotel, Inc. as lessee. A copy of said Lease is attached to

7

Plaintiff/Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 123-130)
(e)

A Lease co\ ering Lot 1. Block 26. Wendover Plat A in Tooele Count). Utah.

by and between StateLine Properties, Inc.. as lessor and Defendant, as lessee. A cop\ of said Lease
is attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 131137)
(f)

Building #406 at Decker Field in Wendover, Utah, under a D.F.A.A. Standard

Lease wherein the city of Wendover appears as lessor and Defendant as lessee. A copy of said Lease
is attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 138149)
3.

The insurance policy issued by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (policy number

CK08305449) covering the slip and fall accident the subject of this litigation insures not only
StateLine Hotel, Inc. (the Defendant), but also StateLine Properties, both the Utah Corporation and
limited partnership. It also insures the StateLine Inn. a Utah Corporation. Property covered by the
policy includes a hotel and motel in Utah; a mobile home park located in Utah; and the properties
set forth in paragraph 2 above.

Pertinent portions of the policy are attached to Plaintiffs

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 150-159)
4.

Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories note not only the post office box located in

Wendover, Utah, mentioned during oral argument at the original hearing, but two additional post
office boxes in Utah. It also shows StateLine Properties, Inc. and StateLine Properties, Ltd.. Utah
entities, shared that post office box. StateLine Hotel, Inc. also has a Utah cellular phone number,

8

regular phone number and six Utah fax numbers. See Defendant's Answer to Interrogator} No. 3,
attached to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. (R. 160-162)
5.

Nearly even agreement entered into b\ Defendant, including the leases and contracts

noted above, show they were executed and notarized in Salt Lake City, Utah. The documents were
also drafted by Utah attorneys.

DEFENDANT TRANSACTS SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS IN UTAH

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss premised upon the absence of personal jurisdiction argues
it has only minimal contacts with Utah (arising out of advertising and promotional activities) which
are insufficient for litigating unrelated causes of action. The foregoing facts indicate it does far
more than simply advertise in Utah. Rather, it occupies no less than six pieces of property in the
State; contracts with several Utah companies; and. interesting enough, is covered for the subject
incident by an insurance policy also covering numerous Utah corporations and properties. All this
is in addition to relevant facts such as maintaining Utah post office boxes, phone numbers and the
substantial advertising it conducts in the State.
Hence, it is almost ludicrous for Defendants to argue it does not have "substantial and
continuous local activity" or that it does not expect to be hailed into Utah courts. (Please here note
that the Answer to Interrogatory #4 discloses numerous other lawsuits pending against Defendant
in the State of Utah). (See Exhibit "E")
At least two recent Utah cases have, under circumstances similar to StateLine Hotel, found
jurisdiction over non-resident corporations. For instance, in Radcliff v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608
9

(Utah 1994). the Court found that non-resident corporations are considered to be doing business in
Utah "if the\ negotiate and enter into contracts within the state" something which Defendant has
clearly done here. And, minimum contacts exists because Defendant could reasonabh anticipate
being hailed into Court here. Bradford v Naegle. 763 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1988). Other factors
relevant in our case include: (1) the presence of employees in the State; and (2) its' leasing or
ownership of real or personal property in the State. See, Hebertson v Willow Creek Plaza. 895 P.2d
839 (Utah 1995).
Attempting to obscure its possession of propert} in Utah. Defendant's earlier filings,
including specifically the affidavits of Larry Herron and Steven Brown Perry state that StateLine
Hotel Inc. "does not own any property in Utah". They go on to state that StateLine Properties owns
a one-half acre parcel of real property in Wendover, Utah.

However, documents later produced

indicate StateLine Properties owns at least five pieces of property in Utah all of which are leased to
Defendant. Further, the} are insured under the same insurance policy disclosing ownership or
possession of additional properties in Utah (at a minimum, the StateLine Inn).
Further, a number of courts have held that advertising and promotional actrvities in a forum
state were alone sufficient to invoke general personal jurisdiction.
In Weintraub v. Walt Disnev World. 825 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Pa. 1993), Pennsylvania
plaintiffs sued a corporation for injuries sustained on a ride at its amusement park and resort in
Florida. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that
defendant had "continuous and systematic" contacts with Pennsylvania. Id. at 721. Weintraub held
it was proper to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the non-resident corporate defendant.
Id at 722.
10

Similar to our facts, the defendant's contacts with the forum included: promoting itb
amusement park and resort through newspapers and magazines circulated in Penns> hama:
promoting its amusement park and resort on television programs and commercials aired in
Pennsylvania; maintaining a toll-free 800 number for Penns\ lvania tra\el agents; and defendant's
representatives visiting that state for public relations purposes.
Boone v. Sulphur Creek Resort, Inc.. 749 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. Ind. 1990) involved an Indiana
resident who brought suit in Indiana against a Kentucky corporation, headquartered in Kentucky,
for injuries sustained at the corporation's resort located in Kentucky. Defendant sought to have
plaintiffs action dismissed arguing the Indiana court lacked jurisdiction over it. The court held
defendant's contacts with Indiana and its residents were '"continuous and systematic" sufficient for
an Indiana court to exercise general personal jurisdiction. Id at 199. In reaching its decision, the
court found that defendant's contacts with Indiana included advertising specifically targeted at
Indiana residents, resulting in Indiana residents making up a large percentage of defendant's
customer base (just as is the case with Utah residents and StateLine's Nevada resort). Furthermore,
defendant sought to serve the Indiana tourist market; its representatives had made reservations for
and taken deposits from Indiana residents while in Indiana; defendant had benefited from Indiana
law and had solicited business there. Id. at 199-200. The court noted that the contacts between
defendant and Indiana involved precisely those the United State Supreme Court has emphasized are
significant. Id at 199: see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct.
559, 62 L. Ed.2d 490 (1980). The court concluded defendant had '"purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state'" and could therefore '"reasonably anticipate
being haled into court [in Indiana].'" Id at 200 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 297).
11

Additionalh. the Boone court recognized Indiana had a significant interest "in regulatii g the
conduct of out-of-state actors who intentionally direct their advertising and promotional pleab to
Indiana residents/* Id at 201. Because plaintiff resided in Indiana and received medical treatment
in Indiana for injuries sustained at defendant's resort. Indiana was a reasonable location for plaintiff
to bring his cause of action. IdL
In Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Co.. 630 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1986), Pennsylvania
residents brought an action in a Pennsylvania court against a Delaware corporation doing business
in Florida for injuries sustained at the corporation's Florida complex. In determining whether
Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over Disney, the court found it conducted extensive advertising in
Pennsylvania for the purpose of promoting its entertainment complex in Florida. Specifically,
defendant promoted its complex by advertising in a Philadelphia newspaper; providing a toll-free
800 number for Pennsylvania residents to use to make reservations; and running a number of
advertisements on local Philadelphia television stations. The court concluded that defendant's
advertisements and related promotional activities reflected an ongoing pattern of activity in
Pennsylvania which was substantial and continuous. Id at 152. Accordingly, the court held that
general personal jurisdiction over defendant was - roper. Id
Here, StateLine conducts extensive and aggressive advertising in Utah to promote its hotel
and casino to Utah residents. StateLine's advertising includes advertisements that run regularly in
local newspapers and magazines as well as frequently aired television and radio commercials on
local Utah stations. StateLine also advertises through the use of billboards throughout Utah, as well
as busing Utah residents to its casino. (R. 56, 59, 60, 61, 62) Coupled with its property interests

12

in Utah it seems these activities piovide ample leasons for this State to exeicise imisdiction o\ei
a Nevada Corpoiation with its principal place of business in a boidei town
Wendover, Ne\ada the town in which StateLine s hotel and casino is located is located on
the Utah-Nevada border Salt Lake City and the Wasatch fiont in general is the closest aiea with a
large concentration of population A large majority of StateLine s advertising and promotional
activities are directed at Utah residents Consequent^, a majority of StateLine's pations are Utah
residents
StateLine maintains an office in Salt Lake City, Utah with StateLine Properties to direct its
advertising campaign and booking reservations for Defendant StateLine's hotel and casino (R 56,
59, 60, 61, 62) StateLine also provides a toll-free 800 number to Utah residents for making
reservations at StateLine's hotel and casino (R 64)
In sum, StateLme's advertising and promotion reflect an ongoing pattern of activity in Utah
Its contacts with Utah are substantial continuous and s> stematic StateLine has purposefulh a\ ailed
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Utah and could therefore reasonabl) anticipate
being haled into court in Utah Utah has a significant interest in regulating the conduct of StateLine
an out-of-state actor who intentionally directs its advertising and promotional pleas to Utah residents
This course of action, of contracting with Utah corporations, having ownership in Utah
corporations and occupying at least six parcels of property, clearly demonstrates substantial contacts
with this forum, and shows that these contacts are "continuous and systematic" It follows that as

3

Although this is not a "forum non conveniens" issue, the ease of obtaining
witnesses' testimony (here far greater in Utah) should be a factor favoring jurisdiction in this
forum
13

required by Abbott. Defendant/Appellee is "doing business" sufficient to confer jurisdiction, as
Defendant Appellee has engaged in substantial and continuous acthfv in Utah.
The Plaintiff made more than a prima facie showing that the trial court maintained pei^onal
jurisdiction, and as evidenced above, its ruling to the contrary is clearh erroneous.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT UTAH'S LONG ARM STATUTE,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2^-24 (1996) DID NOT
CONFER SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEE.

A prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction was also made b\ Plaintiff/Appellant
before the District Court. See Neways. Inc. v. McCauglan. supra. Specific personal jurisdiction
applies to Utah's long-arm statute and requires only minimum contacts with the forum state. Where
a defendant has only minimum contacts, specific personal jurisdiction may be asserted only on
claims arising out of defendant's activity in the forum state.

In Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan v.

National Hotel Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (D. Utah 1987), the Court set forth a three step
analysis for cases asserting specific personal jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm statute. First, it is
necessary to determine whether the facts of the case meet one of the statute's specifically enumerated
acts. Second, whether plaintiffs claim arises out of one of the statute's specifically enumerated acts.
And finally, whether the jifrisdictional assertion meets federal due process requirements. Id. at
1296-1298.

14

StateLine's conduct falls within one of Utah long-arm statute's speciticalh enumerated acts.
Section 78-27-24 of the Utah Code provides in part:
Am person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in
person or through an agent does am of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1)

the transaction of any business within this state: . . .

The long-arm statute "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. Clearly, the legislature intended
to give broad application to the statute. Frontier. 675 F. Supp. at 1297 (quoting Synergetics v.
Marathon Ranching Co.. 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (citing Brow-n v. Carnes Corp.. 611 P.2d
378, 380 (Utah 1980))).
Section 78-27-23 of the Utah Code defines "transaction of business within this state" as
"activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect persons
or businesses within the state of Utah." Utah Code Ann. 78-27-23(2). In light of the broad nature
of the statute and the limited showing required of a plaintiff urging jurisdiction, Neways. supra;
and Frontier. 675 F. Supp. at 1297 & n.5. Ms. Buddensick has made a prima facie showing that the
Utah long-arm statute confers specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. By virtue of its
substantial transaction of business in Utah (as set out more fully above in Point I), StateLine has
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Utah.
Plaintiffs claim also meets the second step in the jurisdictional analysis. Plaintiffs claim
against StateLine for negligence arises out of StateLine's transaction of business in Utah in that she

15

traveled to Wendover and was a guest at StateLine'b hotel and casino due in part to StateLine's
advertising and promotional acthities.
In Alexander v. Circus Enters.. Inc.. 939 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1991). California residents
brought a cause of action in California against a Ne\ada hotel and casino for injuries sustained on
a pontoon boat associated with the resort. In deciding whether specific personal jurisdiction was
proper over the Nevada defendant, the court first concluded defendant had substantial advertising
directed at Southern California and that defendant had therefore purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Id. at 851-53. The court went on to determine
whether plaintiffs claim arose out of defendant's forum related activity. Applying a "but for" test,
the court concluded that plaintiffs claim did in fact arise out of defendant's advertising activities
in California. Id. At 853. The court reasoned that defendant's solicitation of business in California
attracted plaintiffs to the hotel and casino and subsequent pontoon boat ride. "It was the defendant's
forum-related activities that put the parties within 'tortious striking distance* of one another.'* Id.
(quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines. 897 F.2d 377, (9th Cir. 1990). The court held that specific
personal jurisdiction over the Nevada defendant was proper in California. IcL At 854.
The final and dispositive step in this analysis requires the assertion of jurisdiction to comply
with federal due process limitations. In determining if the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with due process, "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully
established 'minimum contacts' with the forum state." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471 U.S.
462, 474 (1985) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In
assessing minimum contacts, it is necessary to focus on the relationship of the defendant, the forum
and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner. 435 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Moreover, it must be foreseeable
16

that the "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that [it] should
reasonabh anticipate being haled into court""" in the forum state. Burger King. 471 U.S. at 474
(quoting Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. \. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286. 297 (1980)). because it has
'"purposefully availfed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protection of its law.'"" Burger King. 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
StateLine's conduct and connection with Utah is such that it has purposefully established
minimum contacts with Utah to the extent it should reasonably anticipate being subject to
jurisdiction in Utah. StateLine's connection to the forum is its transacting business in Utah.
Specifically, StateLine conducts extensive and aggressive advertising in Utah directed at Utah
residents, owns/leases property in Utah, contracts with at least three Utah corporations and has an
ownership interest in a Utah corporation. It was this activity that resulted in plaintiffs injury and
later precipitated this litigation. Alexander. 939 F.2d at 853 (citing Shute. 897 F.2d at 383-84) ("a
tort can arise out of a prior business solicitation in the forum state''). And while the foreseeability
of causing injury that will be felt in another state, is by itself not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction,
World-wide Volkswagen. 444 U.S. at 294, StateLine has sufficient other contacts with Utah to
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.
StateLine's contacts with Utah have been discussed at length throughout this Brief. It is
undoubtedly the magnitude of its property leasing, ownership interests, contracts with Utah
residents, and StateLine's advertising and promotional activities in Utah that is significant.
In analyzing StateLine's relation to the Utah forum, it cannot be overemphasized that
StateLine is located in Wendover, a border-town that sits on the Utah-Nevada border. And that Salt
17

Lake Cit\ and the Wasatch fiont in geneial is the closest aiea with a laige concentiation ot
population This fact alone makes this case unique in that a laige majonu ot Staiel ine s ad\ u using
and promotional acti\ lties aie dnected at L tah lesidents Consequenth a ma]ont\ of StateLine s
patrons are Utah residents
StateLine deliberately created continuing obligations between itself and Utah b\ ti ansae ting
business in Utah It is not inconsistent with due process foi this court to asseit junsdiction o\ei a
party who created a continuing relationship and obligation with another state Burgei King 471 L S
at 473 (quoting Travelers Health Ass'n \ Virginia, 339 U S 643 647 (1950)) Because StateLine
has "manifestly

availed [itself] of the privilege of conducting business [in Utah], it is

presumptively not unreasonable to require [it] to submit to the burdens of litigation in [Utah] as
well " Burger King. 471 U S at 475-76 (citations omitted) Ha\mg profited from its mtei state
activities in Utah it would be unfair to allow StateLine * to escape haung to account in [Utah] ioi
consequences that arise proximately from such acti\ lties ' ld_ at 474
Having established minimum contacts between StateLine and Utah, it is incumbent upon
StateLine to * present a compelling case" that other factors make jurisdiction of thi^ court
unreasonable Id_ at 477 StateLine avers that its burden of litigating in Utah is too great and that
plaintiff could obtain relief from Nevada courts While StateLine s assertion alone falls short of
w

compelling," it is unfounded in that burden of plaintiff having to prosecute her case in Ne\ada is

equall} as great or greater Utah has "manifest interest" in providing Plaintiff/Appellant with a
convenient forum for redressing injuries resulting from StateLine's negligence See Id. at 473
In conclusion, StateLine's activities meet Frontier s three step te^t for asserting specific
personal jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has met the Neways' requirement of establishing a prima facie
18

showing that the long-arm statute applies. It is clear that Plaintiff Appellant's claim against
StateLine for negligence arises out of one of the statute's specifically enumerated acts, namch . the
transaction of business. Finalh. StateLine has purposefulh established minimum contacts with
Utah, making this court' jurisdiction over it consistent with federal due process requirements.

CONCLUSION

This Court should properly reverse the trial court's erroneous rulings, and remand for trial
because:
1.

Plaintiff/Appellant has made a prima facie showing that general personal jurisdiction

exists over Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant has demonstrated that Defendant /Appellee has
substantial contacts with this forum that are continuous and systematic, and that Defendant/Appellee
has engaged in substantial and continuous local activity, which is sufficient to reach the requirement
of "doing business" within the State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff/Appellant has made a prima facie showing that specific personal jurisdiction

exists over Defendant/Appellee. Defendant/Appellee is transacting business within this State,
Plaintiff/Appellant's

claim arises out of the transacting

of business in Utah and

Defendant/Appellee's business activities are such that they have purposely availed themselves to the
jurisdiction of Utah courts satisfying federal due process requirements.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

lb

da% of June. 1998.

SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

Michael'XTKatz
Deven J. Coggins
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this

*J

da\ of June. 11998.
* two copies of the

foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully prepaid, to:

Cynthia Meyer
Stephen G. Morgan
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE
Kearns Building
136 South Main, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXHIBIT "A"

78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether
tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission in this
state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act
is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over
which the defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78,
Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of
establishing responsibility for child support.
1992

EXHIBIT "B"

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed

EXHIBIT "C"

STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-7888
Fax number: (801) 531-9732
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS BUDDENSICK,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.

STATELINE CASINO, INC., dba
STATELINE HOTEL AND CASINO,
and DOES I-X,

Civil No. 9709003891PI

Defendant.

Judge William A. Thorne

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Based on Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction was initially argued before die Court on June 30, 1997. Cynthia K.C. Meyer of
Morgan & Hansen appeared for the Defendant, State Line Hotel, Inc., and Michael A. Katz of
Siegfried & Jensen appeared for the Plaintiff, Chris Buddensick. After argument, the Court set

the matter for an evidentiary hearing and allowed Plaintiff to engage in discovery. The Court's
ruling in that regard was made on the record on June 30, 1997.
The matter was again heard on September 15, 1997, the date set for evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Meyer again appeared for the Defendant and Mr. Katz again appeared for Plaintiff. Plaintiff
did not present evidence, but had engaged in discovery during the interim between the two
hearings.
The Court, having read and considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the
parties, including the supplemental memoranda containing discovery responses submitted by the
parties prior to the September 15, 1997, hearing, having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel, being familiar with and having reviewed the file, being fully advised in the premises, and
good cause otherwise appearing, now makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant, the State Line Hotel. Inc., is a Nevada corporation which owns and

operates the State Line Hotel and Casino in Wendover, Nevada.
2.

On July 29, 1995, Plaintiff slipped and fell on the premises of the State Line

Hotel and Casino while going through a food buffet line.
3.

Defendant advertises its Nevada hotel and casino in Utah.

T \WP51\BUDDENS\FINDFACT WPD
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4.

Defendant contracts for goods and services from entities in several states

including Utah and Nevada.
5.

Defendant owns stock in a Utah corporation, State Line Properties, Inc., which

is the general partner of a Utah limited partnership, State Line Properties, Ltd. State Line
Properties, Inc., and State Line Properties, Ltd., along with several other entities, are named
insureds under the same insurance policy as Defendant.
6.

State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line Properties, Ltd. own five parcels of

real property in Wendover, Utah, which they lease to Defendant. Two of the parcels are used
for parking lot, parking structure, and signage purposes relating to Defendant's hotel and
casino business. The city of Wendover leases a storage unit at Decker Field to Defendant.
7.

Defendant's leasing of incidental parcels including signage and parking areas

while directly related to the carrying-on of its business in Nevada is not an integral part of the
business in the sense that the hotel and casino could not continue without it.
8.

Defendant does not own any real property in Utah.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Plaintiffs slip and fall and her subsequent cause of action against Defendant did

not arise out of Defendant's contacts with the state of Utah; therefore, Utah's Long-Arm
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 does not apply.

T \WP51\BUDDENS\FINDFACT WPD
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2.

Defendant does not do business in Utah by virtue of its ownership of stock in

State Line Properties, Inc., a Utah Corporation, which does business in Utah. In addition,
Defendant does not do business in Utah by virtue of the commonality of stock holders and
partners among Defendant, State Line Properties, Inc. and State Line Properties, Ltd.
3.

The fact that Defendant, State Line Properties, Inc., and State Line Properties,

Ltd., are insured under the same insurance policy is irrelevant.
4.

Defendant's advertising and promotional activities in Utah are insufficient to

confer general personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Utah courts.
5.

The Defendant's leasing of the parcels of real property in Wendover, Utah, is

insufficient to confer general personal jurisdiction over Defendant in Utah courts.
6.

Overall, Defendant's contacts with Utah are limited in nature (although some

are continuous) and are not tantamount to doing business in Utah, such that the exercise of
general personal jurisdiction over Defendant would be appropriate.
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiffs Complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice
on the grounds that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant, either
general or specific.

T \WP51\BUDDENS\FINDFACT WPD
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DATED this

^

day of 3€£te&ber, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

William A. Tnorne
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
(

Michael A. Katz
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

T \WP51\BUDDENS\FINDFACT WPD

~1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the }i) day of JifitZmfai- . 1997, pursuant to
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Jud. Admin., I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER to be served on
the following for approval as to form via first class mail, postage pre-paid:
Michael A. Katz
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5684 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123

"l\}kuuc Tiler-
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EXHIBIT "D"

o*T"0<r* o © (** ** &i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

-oOo-

3

S ,

Ovy^
Deputy CJerx

Case No. 970900389 PI

Plaintiff,

HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

6

8

By

CHRIS BUDDENSICK,

5

7

Triira Judicial uistnct
FEB 1 1 1998

STATE OF UTAH

2

4

oP^P^^Ss^^ySFlTY

STATE LINE HOTEL, INC., dba
STATE LINE HOTEL AND
CASINO, and DOES I-X,

(Videotape Proceedings)

Defendants.

9

-oOo-

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day of June,

12
13

1997,

commencing at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the above-

14

entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE

15

WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the above-named

16

Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the

17

following videotape proceedings were had.

FILED

18
A P P E A R A N C E S

19
20

For t h e

P l a i n t i f f ::

S l i S S K d * SnseS?«JRT OF APPEALS

21

5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah
84123

22
23

FEB 1 2 1938

MICHAEL A. KATZ
A t t o r n e y a t Law

For the Defendants:

24
25

D U P L I C A T E

ORIGINAL

CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
Attorney at Law
Morgan & Hansen
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
ALAN P SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107

maSMA

3-Ma

PRO C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:
State Line Casino.

The Buddensick versus

Are we ready to go forward with that,

or—
MR. KATZ:
THE COURT:

Yes, we are, your Honor.
Okay.

Come on up and

we'll go ahead and get that started.
This is Case ]Mo. 970900389, Buddensick versus
State Line Casino, Inc.

I'll ask each of you to make an

appearance t, if you would, so the record is complete.
MR. KATZ:

Michael A. Katz, appearing

on behalf of the plaintiff, your Honor.
MS. MEYER:

Cindy Meyer on behalf of

THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. MEYER:

Thank you, your Honor.

the defendant.
Ms. Meyer, this is

your motion.

Your Honor, plaintiff had a slip and fall
accident in the State Line Hotel in Wendover, Nevada.
THE COURT:

That would be in the

MS. MEYER:

In the restaurant portion

THE COURT:

Okay.

restaurant portion?

of the hotel.

2

1

MS. MEYER:

2

She was in the food

buffet line.

3

That occurred in July of 1995.

4

There's some

reference to 1996, but it really was '95.

g

She filed her lawsuit early this year and State

g

Line Hotel, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

j

jurisdiction, and specifically, lack of personal

g

jurisdiction over the State Line.

g

Now, plaintiff—we filed the motion in midMarch, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition in

10

mid-May, pursuant to agreements to extend the time, we've

11

been very lenient with each other that way.

12

reply memorandum and then last Friday, the plaintiff sent

13

to the Court under a cover letter, a couple of orders

14

from a case that was—

15
16
17

18
19

We filed our

I

THE COURT:

(Inaudible)

MS. MEYER:

In the Patton case in the

United States District Court.
You know, the cases are unrelated, other than

20

the fact that there were injuries on the premises.

21

are the only operative facts that are similar.

22

Those

That the orders are—are not—they don't have

23

precedential value, they weren't published, they don't

24

contain the reasoning and procedurally, it seems like,

25

you know, it's a pretty unfair procedure.

There was the

1

two months to file a memorandum in opposition and to

2

include whatever the—or whatever the plaintiff wanted to

3

include in the opposition papers and that wasn't done,

4

and that was the reason we filed a motion to strike on

5

Friday as well,

g

Let me turn to the motion to dismiss, however,

j

your Honor.

g

personal jurisdiction.

g

statute, which is found in Section 78-27-24.

1Q

And first, I'd like to address the specific
That arises under Utah's long-arm

And what it states is that a person, whether or

1<l

not a resident of Utah, submits himself to the

^2

jurisdiction of Utah's courts for any causes of action

13

arising out of, among other things, the transaction of

14

business in Utah or the causing of an injury in Utah.

15

Now, plaintiff claims that her—her claim arose

-I0

from State Line's transacting business in Utah because it

17

advertises here.

18

the injury sub-part of the paragraph, which is the

19

causing of an injury here, because her injury—her injury

20

wasn't caused here.

21
22
23
24
25

She does not claim that it arises under

Her injury was caused in Nevada.

Now, her injury does not arise from and was not
caused by advertising, your Honor.

If you look at her

complaint, she says the State Line failed to maintain its
premises in a reasonably safe manner.
That's what caused her injuries.

That's negligence.

It didn't arise out of

i o

1
2

any advertising.
The plaintiff does rely on a couple of Ninth

3

Circuit Court of Appeals cases, but neither of those

4

cases are—are good law, any longer.

5

the Alexander vs. Circus Circus case, and that was a case

The first case was

in which the Ninth Circuit said that but for the
7 I defendant's advertising in the forum, plaintiff would not
Q
g

have gone out of state and become injured.
A petition for re-hearing was filed by the

10

defendant, however.

11

granted, the Ninth Circuit withdrew that opinion that I

12

just mentioned, that the plaintiff relies on and then

13

quashed service of process and dismissed the complaint

14
15
16
17

The petition for re-hearing was

for lack of personal jurisdiction.

So, that case—I

mean, you just can't rely on it at all.
The other case was Shute—S-h-u-t-e—vs.
I Carnival Cruise Lines.

The Ninth Circuit said the same

18

thing, but for Carnival Cruise Line's promotion in the

19

State of Washington, Shute would not have gone on the

20

cruise and become injured in a slip and fall on the—on

21

the cruise deck in international waters.

22

That case eventually went to the United States

23

Supreme Court and the Supreme Court reversed.

Now, it

24

reversed for slightly different reasons.

25

-there was a clause in the contract which said that all

There had been-

litigation would be filed in—in Florida.

The Ninth

Circuit had said that clause is unenforceable and, but
for the promotion, he wouldn't have been injured.
The Supreme Court said the clause is
enforceable so, you know, it gets kicked out and—and
needs to be tried in Florida.
There are many courts that do not rely on this
"but for11 analysis and—and the reasoning is—is very
understandable•

There is no cause and effect

relationship between the advertising or the promotion and
the injury itself.

It's just too attenuated to make some

kind of connection.
And one case that's directly on point is a case
that we cited in our reply memorandum, perhaps in our
memorandum in support as well, called Munlev vs. Second
District Court.

That was a case filed by a Nevada

resident, Munley, who went to the California side of Lake
Tahoe to ski and he was injured.

I think he fell off the

chair lift or something like that. And he claimed that
there was specific personal jurisdiction due to the ski
resort's advertising in Nevada.
Now, the ski resort—the Court said all the ski
resort did was promotional activities in Nevada; but it
was a member of the Reno-Sparks Chamber of Commerce, it
sent travel brochures, it advertised in newspapers and so

i/l

1

forth.

It did, really, quite a bit of advertising.

2

And the Court said, that's not what—even if

3

that is transacting business, even if we accept that,

4

that's not what the injuries arose from.

5

plaintiff responded directly to those promotional

g

activities in going to Nevada, that's still not what

j

caused these injuries.

g
g
«IQ

Look at the complaint.

And even if the

What caused his

injuries is the alleged failure to maintain the chair
lift.

Same in our case.

What caused the injuries is the

-J-J I alleged failure to maintain the floor around the buffet
«I2

food line and not any advertising.

-13 |

So, the plaintiff in this case can only

.J4 I establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant under
«I5

the general jurisdiction notion, not under the long-arm

<lg i statute.
]j I

Now, under the general jurisdiction notion, a

18

court—and—and let me just interrupt myself.

This law

19

is developed primarily through United States Supreme

20

Court decisions, State Supreme Court decisions, this is

21

case law rather than statutory law, most of the time.

22

And a court can have general personal

23

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for any claim

24
25

if the defendant's activities in the State are so
substantial and continuous that the traditional notions

1

of fair play and justice are not: violated by bringing

2

that defendant into the out-of-state courts in order to

3

litigate those claims.

4

Now, in Mallory Engineering vs. Ted R, Brown &

5

Associates. a Utah Supreme Court case, the Utah Supreme

5

Court contrasted the general personal jurisdiction to

7

specific personal jurisdiction and commented on specific

3

personal jurisdiction by saying that if the activities of

g

the defendant are limited in nature or transitory in

1Q

duration, then the courts can only assume personal

H J jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.
12 I

And that's what we have here. We have

13 I advertising that's limited in nature.
14
15

-|Q
17

18

transitory in duration.

It's also

The State Line operates its

J hotel and casino in Nevada, not here in—in Utah.

What

it does in Utah is promote the hotel and casino business.
The Utah appellate courts have not specifically
addressed these issues, but there are many other cases

19 that have directly addressed the advertising issues and
2Q I whether that's enough to confer general personal
2-|
22

jurisdiction.
And one of the most notable cases is a case

23

that's very similar to this case, which is called State

24

(inaudible^ Circus Circus vs. Pope.

25

It involved an

Oregon resident, Pope, who went to Circus Circus in Reno,

8

-I

I believe, and was injured when a drunken guest pitched a

2

beer bottle out of a hotel window and—and cracked him in

3

the head or something like that.

4

Pope then sued Circus Circus in Oregon and

c

claimed that there was jurisdiction.

g

general jurisdiction, Pope made the same argument that

j

the plaintiff makes in this case, that the hotel and

«

casino's activities in Oregon were substantial because it

9
10
11
12

13

With respect to

advertised and it maintained a toll-free 800 number.
But the Oregon Supreme Court rejected that
argument and said, we're unpersuaded that that's any kind
of substantial activity.
Another case, not involving hotels and casinos,

14

but similar in reasoning is the case called Conaoleum

15

Corp. vs. D.L.W. Acting Gasell Shoft (?), which is a

16

Ninth Circuit case from 1984. And in that case, the

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

foreign defendant's in-state activities consisted of
sales and marketing efforts through a California company
is hired to do the sales and marketing.
And I jotted down what it did.

The—the

California company, which was not the same as—as the
foreign company, solicited orders, it recommended other
sales agents, ordered samples, promoted the D.L.W.
products through mail and show room display and attended
trade shows and sales meetings.

1

And the Ninth Circuit stated that the

2

maintenance of even a substantial sales force is not

3

sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated

4

cause of action.

5

case—well, we don't have a substantial sales force, but

g

again, we have—we have promotion*

And that's what we have here in this

Plaintiff mentioned in the memorandum in
g I opposition the—the sales office in Salt Lake City.

That

g

sales office is operated by a Utah company called State

10

Line Properties, Limited, and it takes reservations for

11

hotel rooms, golf packages, gaming tournaments, shows and

12

so forth, but it's not the State Line Hotel here doing

.j3

business, it's a Utah company, a limited partnership, the

14

general partner of which is a Utah corporation.
We've cited several other cases. We certainly

15
16
17

don't need to go into all of those, but suffice it to say
that in case after case after case, where what we're

18

talking about is advertising and promotion, the courts

19

have said—
THE COURT:

20

I'm sorry, Counsel.

Let

21

me back up just to a point that you mentioned a moment

22

ago.

23

majority shareholder of the Utah corporation?

24
25

Isn't the Nevada corporation a general or the

MS. MEYER:

I don't believe so.

think it has been, in the past; but even if it were,

10

I

1

what—well, what plaintiff mentioned in the—in the

2

memorandum in opposition is that the shareholders—there

3

are common shareholders, I believe.

4

But even—even so, that doesn't, unless we're

5

trying to break down corporate formalities and there have

g

been no claims of alter ego or piercing the corporate

j

veil or anything like that, then we still don't get to

g

jurisdiction because there's a—a related company that

g

the—that's actually a Utah corporation; in fact, there's

10
^

substantial case law and we cited a case in our reply
memorandum concerning bringing in parent corporations

12

when there's a subsidiary that is a resident of the

13

state•

14

Quite often, you know, you have a parent

15

corporation that owns all of the stock in a subsidiary,

16

but they're—they're domiciled in different states. And

17

time after time, the courts have rejected any notion that

18

because of that ownership alone, you can bring that

19

parent corporation in.

20
21
22
23
24
25

You've got to be able to show

either the specific jurisdiction because of acts arising
in the forum, or the general jurisdiction.
Plaintiff relies on a couple of cases from the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the proposition that
advertising is enough to establish general jurisdiction
over an out-of-state company.

11

1

Those cases both involve Walt Disney World, and

2

as I mentioned, they're both arising out of the Eastern

3

District of Pennsylvania.

4

The first case is called Weintrol vs. Walt

5

Disney World.

And it recognized a line of cases

6

involving Walt Disney and apparently arising in

7

Pennsylvania in which the courts said that there was not

8

jurisdiction because the advertising alone was

g

insufficient to confer that general jurisdiction.

10

THE COURT:

Wasn't there

-11 I transportation involved in that (Inaudible)
-j2

MS. MEYER:

Well, yeah, in that case

-I3

and—and the Court distinguished those other cases and

14

said there's a lot more going on than just advertising.

15

We have Disney people, you know, conducting a seminar in

1g

Pittsburgh, they're coming in for college relations, I

17

think they were recruiting college students to go down

1Q

and work.

19

staffing purposes and sent the publicity staff to

20

Pennsylvania and for all of those combined reasons, the

-21

court said that—that's pretty intentional—well,

22

intentional isn't the word, but it—it's substantial

23

conduct and that's enough to confer general jurisdiction.

24
25

They sent representatives for professional

THE COURT:
choosing to do business—
12

It's the corporation

1

MS. MEYER:

That's right.

2

THE COURT:

— i n Pennsylvania.

3

MS. MEYER:

That's right.

Actually

4

going to Pennsylvania and conducting business, rather

5

than just promoting a theme park in Florida,

g

Same thing in the Gavigan case, versus Walt

7

Disney World.

g

that was the word I was looking for—conduct in

g

Pennsylvania beyond mere advertising that caused that

1Q

court to say again, we—we have personal jurisdiction

^

over this company,

12
13
14

15

There was—there was similar purposeful—

And here in the state—in this case, the only
evidence that we have is that the State Line advertises.
I Plaintiff hasn't submitted any evidence concerning the
amount of advertising or the extent of advertising, other

1g | than to use strong adjectives in—in the memoranda.
17

And even under these authorities relied on by

18

the plaintiff, again, merely advertising is not enough to

19

confer general jurisdiction.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Your Honor, I have some of the main cases we
relied on, if it would be helpful to the Court, I'd like
to hand that up.

Would that be all right?
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. MEYER:

And let me just for the

record indicate that the cases I've handed up to the

13

1

Court are the Circus Circus vs. Pope, the Conaoleum vs.

2

the D.L.W., and the long German name, Price and Sons vs.

3

the Second District Court and the Munley vs. the Second

4

District Court.

5

Your Honor, the relief we're asking for is that

g

the Court dismiss the complaint for lack of personal

7

jurisdiction and strike plaintiff's submission to the

3

Court of last Friday,

g

Thank you,
THE COURT:

10
-j-j I

MR. KATZ:

12
13
14
15

Mr. Katz?
Thank you, your Honor.

Initially, permit me to address, please, the
allegations and the arguments made concerning the motion
to strike.
The orders that we submitted from Judge Sam, I

16
17

did not submit those claiming that they are binding

18

of Judge Sam's ruling in an identical motion to dismiss.

19

In that case, they also had a motion for change of venue

20

because it was in the Federal Court and could have

21

transferred over to Nevada; the fact is, Judge Sam denied

22

those motions and the memorandums of the parties were

23

almost identical, the issues raised were almost identical

24

and Judge Sam ruled against defendant in that case.

25

precedent on this Court.

They are, however, indicative

That

was the purpose of my showing them to you and submitting

14

1

them for your review.

2

The question raised by the motion is whether or

3

not we have met the standards needed for either specific

4

or general jurisdiction over the defendant.

5

general jurisdiction provisions, the question becomes

6

whether or not the defendant conducts substantial and

7

continuous local activity.

3
g

Under the

And as the memoranda reflect, we believe that
probably the strongest evidence of substantial and

10

continuous local activity is defendant's advertising

11

activities within the State; however, in contrary to the

12

cases that the defendant primarily relies upon, which by

13

the way, are mixed, as the memoranda indicate.

14

courts have held that advertising alone is sufficient.

15

Nothing else.

1g

The cases are mixed.

Some

We've cited a bunch,

17

they've cited a bunch.

18

cases are, frankly, more persuasive, but we think we've

19

got a lot more facts to rely upon to show continuous and

20

local activity.

21
22

Court—

23
24
25

I think they're—I think our

And I'd like to go over those with the

THE COURT:
MR. KATZ:

Okay.
— i f I might, because I

think that is the central inquiry raised by the motion,
Number one, we do have common ownership and

15

1

management of the two entities-

2

State Line Properties, and State Line Hotel, the Nevada

3

corporation.

4

One, a Utah corporation,

In fact, their memoranda states that State Line

5

Hotel is the sole owner of State Line Properties.

5

is in the affidavit of Larry Herrin, which we attached as

7

an exhibit to the memorandum.

g
g

That

It states that they own the stock, period.
Over and out.

It's a wholly-owned subsidiary.

And while

10

we admit that owning a subsidiary, by itself, is not

H

adequate, it does reflect continuous and substantial

12

local activity.

Not just advertising.

13 | subsidiary is a Utah corporation.

Wholly-owned

That Utah corporation

14 I owns property in the State of Utah.
15
16
17
18

Mr. Herrin's affidavit, which is attached as
Exhibit B, also indicates there's common stockholders
among the corporation and common management.
Mr. Jim Smith, Mr. Herrin, himself, who

19

submitted the affidavit in the Federal Court case.

20

There's a lot more here than just advertising activities,

21

which your Honor is probably familiar with if you—if you

22

drive the freeways around Salt Lake. You've seen the

23

billboards, you've seen the ads in the newspapers.

24
25

But we believe there's even more, your Honor.
If I might approach and I've provided Ms. Meyer with
16

copies, these are some other submittals that were in
evidence before Judge Sam.
What I've handed you, your Honor, is the
accident report that was submitted in the Patton case.
You'll note it says State Line Hotel Casino and
Convention Center.

Wendover, Utah, your Honor, is the

address.
I would also like to submit—
THE COURT:

Well, it's a post office

box.
MR. KATZ:

Yes.

But it shows

activities, continuous activities within the State of
Utah.

They maintain their post office box here, your

Honor.
I would also like to hand you a supplemental
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) that was sent
in by the defendant.

It states as one of their witnesses

in the Patton case, State Line Hotel, Wendover, Utah.
Once again, they're claiming that they're located in
Wendover, Utah.
And if I might also submit defendant's Rule
26(a) disclosures in the Federal Court case.

And these

are additional accident reports, your Honor, that were
submitted in connection with Patton.
And what I'd like you to note on these, if you

17

7

1

would, please, is the fax, information contained at the

2

top of the statements.

3

801-532-4090.

4

the State Line Hotel.

5

Utah corporation, State Line Hotel.

5

State Line Hotel, Fax No.

That's a Utah area code, your Honor, for
Not State Line Properties, the

So, we're not just saying they advertise, your

7

Honor, although they do substantial and continuous and

3

costly, undoubtedly costly advertising; they have most of

g

their employees residents of the State of Nevada.

That's

ig

also indicated in the 26(a) disclosures.

11

or four witnesses, all of them are employees who have

12

Utah residences.

13

They list three

They maintain post office boxes in the State of

14

Utah.

15

of Utah.

1g

corporations and we believe those shareholders are

17

residents of the State of Utah.

13

They have wholly-owned subsidiaries in the State
They have common shareholders with Utah

And they maintain telephone numbers and fax

19

machines in the State of Utah, which I think very clearly

20

raises an inference that they maintain offices in the

21

State of Utah.

22

They can't have it both ways.

I'd like to point out just a couple other

23

things, your Honor, that I don't believe were addressed

24

very much in the memorandum.

25

substantial and continuous local activities which support

18

We believe there are the

-j

the Court's exercise of jurisdiction, and I think perhaps

2

to preface this comment, I should note that the long-arm

3

statute is to be construed as broadly as possible, so as

4

to confer jurisdiction over non-residents.

5

that policy.

5

So, we've got

And we also have the court stating, and I'm

7

specifically referring to the very recent case of

8

Anderson v s . American Society of Plastic Surgeons, an

g

expansive grant of jurisdictional power is conferred upon

-JO
H

the Courts of this case (sic) over non-residents.
j

So, we think the general policy is that,

12 | plaintiffs get the benefit of the doubt in cases like
13 I this.
14

But as the submittals of the parties recognize,

there's affidavits, t h e r e ' s — t h e r e ' s exhibits.

15 I believe there should be depositions.

There—we

We believe that if

1g

they're going to claim that they don't do anything in the

17

State, we are entitled to conduct discovery on that issue
and perhaps this motion is presently premature,

ig I

And once again, we rely upon, to support that

20

principle, the recent case of Anderson v s . American

21

Society of Plastic Surgeons, the citation on that is 807

22

P.2d 825.

23
24
25

That case stands for the proposition that this

is a fact-laden inquiry.

If there are disputes and once

again, the benefit of the doubt is given the plaintiff as
it would be, for instance, on a — o n a summary

19

judgment

1

motion.

The facts are construed in our favor; but

2 J nonetheless, if the defendant can raise some evidence
that general jurisdiction should not be exercised, this
4 I is the kind of thing that should be resolved at trial.
5

You try the jurisdictional facts at the time you try the

5

underlying facts.

7

Or another option that the American Society of

3

Plastic Surgeons case gives your Honor is, since there

g

are disputes, since it is an intricate issue, competing

-(0

claims, competing allegations, your Honor should perhaps

-(-I

conduct an evidentiary hearing and that's another option

-12

that the District Court is given by the Supreme Court in

-j3

the plastic surgeons case.

-14

We think—you don't have to do that, your

-I5

Honor.

-jg

that reflect the fact that State Line Hotel expects to be

jj

hailed into the courts of this State; they have Utah

-jg

subsidiaries, they have Utah officers, they have Utah

-•g

shareholders, they conduct substantial activities beyond

20
21
22
23
24
25

We think we've given you a number of documents

advertising, we're not just relying on advertising, we're
relying on a whole series of interactions with Utah
residents, with Utah courts, with Utah business, they
contract for services here.

They contract for food, they

buy food in the State of Utah.
And unlike all of the cases that either side

20

1

cites, it's significant to note that this is a border

2

town. Most of Wendover, at least, I believe most of the

3

residences in Wendover, actually lie on the Utah side of

4

the—of the border.

5

distinction, I guess is what I'm saying,

5

It—it's kind of an artificial

In closing, your Honor, I would like to point

7

out one other fact that does weigh in our favor, and that

3

is the convenience of the parties. If their officers,

g

managers, employees are residents of Utah, it's far more

10

convenient for both sides, not just the plaintiffs, but

H

both sides, to litigate this case in the State of Utah.

12

For instance, the plaintiff's treating

13

physicians, who will undoubtedly have to be deposed, are

14

all Salt Lake residents.

15

would be far more convenient for both sides, to litigate

1g

this case in Utah and convenience is a very important

17

factor that the Court recognizes in the Mai lory vs. Ted

13

Brown case, which the defense already directed your

19

attention to.

22
23

has substantial contacts with Utah. They do conduct
continuous local activities here. They should expect to
be hailed into the Utah courts for suit.
We believe the motion to dismiss should be

24
25

It

State Line Hotel, albeit a Nevada corporation,

20
21

The plaintiff resides here.

denied.
21

1

THE COURT:

Ms- Meyer?

2

MS. MEYER:

Thanks, your Honor.

3

Now, with regard to motion to strike, if Judge

4

Sam's orders aren't precedents and they're merely

5

interesting and shouldn't have been submitted.

5

And I'd like to clarify something.

There is

y

not one case in either memoranda that was submitted to

g

the Court in which any court held that mere advertising

g

is enough to confer general jurisdiction.

Even in "the

10

Boone vs. Sulphur Creek case cited by the plaintiff, the

11

court found that there was other purposeful conduct

12

besides advertising on the part of the owner of the

13

resort in going to Indiana, that went beyond advertising.

14

Your Honor, these submissions—I mean, you

15

know, this is another reason that we have rules with

1g

respect to filing a motion and filing a memorandum and

17

having the reply time.

18

memorandums, if they'd been argued in the memorandums, I

19

could have responded to them in the reply.

20
21
22
23
24
25

If these had been attached to the

As it is,

what I need to do is—is make some kind of a proffer and-and hope that that's sufficient.
In another case that we have, one of the things
we learned about the P.O. boxes is that, at least as of a
couple of years ago, I don't know if it's still the case
now; there was not a post office on the Nevada side of

22

7 f

the town of Wendover, and there was not door-to-door mail
delivery.

So,

if anyone wanted to receive mail, they had

to have a post office box in the Wendover, Utah post
office.

That's just the way it worked in Wendover.

That

isn't substantial contact with the State, that's just the
way it was in that small town.
It's kind of like Park City.

A lot of people

know that if you want a good mail delivery—and I
understand this is changing lately—that you need to get
a post office box.

And—and as I said, in Wendover, they

didn't even have the door-to-door mail delivery, so they
had to have a post office box.

That's not a physical

address.
There is no question and there's no dispute
that the entirety of the State Line Hotel and Casino
premises are located on the Nevada side.

I don't know—

you know, I don't have an answer to the Fax number other
than, you know, perhaps it came from—actually came from
the State Line Properties office; but if you look at the
State Line letterhead, where it has the post office box
in Utah, it has the 702 number.
If you call out there and when I've called out
there, when I call my client, I call Nevada, I call 702
and—and whatever the phone number is.
Same with the employees who were going to

23

1

testify in the Patton case.

2

have to give addresses under the Rule 26(a)(1)

3

disclosures in Federal Court, their addresses are the

4

post office boxes because that's the only way they can be

5

reached.

g

you want to mail something to them, that's—that's the

j

way they need to be reached.

g
g

The addresses, you know, we

There are street addresses apparently, but if

I think that was—those were really the only
issues that were raised.

Oh, no.

On the supplemental

10

disclosure under Rule 26, it says Rule 26(e) in the

11

Patton case, we make reference to Steve LeMaster, State

12

Line Hotel, Wendover, Utah.
That's a typographical error, for one of two

13
14

reasons, and I don't remember where LeMaster was at the

15

time.

16

dealing with in this case, that's in Nevada, and so the

-jy

Utah's a typographical error.

If he were at the State Line Hotel that we're

There is, however, a hotel on the Utah side

18
19

called the State Line Inn.

20

would be Utah, but then State Line Hotel would be wrong,

21

it should have said State Line Inn; but again, there's no

22

question.

23

Nevada.

24
25

Now, if that's the case, that

Physically, State Line Hotel and Casino is in
Physically, plaintiff's injury occurred in

Nevada, not in Utah.
The plaintiff makes some argument that—that

24

1

this motion may be premature under—under Rule 12(b).

2

certainly have the right to file an immediate motion to

3

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

4

We

Plaintiff did not come into Court and seek to

5

do any discovery and could have done so on this issue.

g

Plaintiff has the burden of proof, not the defense, once

7

the jurisdiction is contested•
It—it, I think would be improper to proceed

8

g

with an evidentiary hearing here today and I—I donrt

10

think the plaintiff is really proposing that we do so;

11

but again, bringing in all of this additional evidence

12

and not following the procedures really is unfair.
The fact that Wendover is a border town isn't

13
14

significant.

15

significance of state lines and whether we respect state

16

lines for jurisdictional purposes, and the Utah Supreme

17

18

Court in Worldwide Volkswagen says, we don't ignore state
lines, we cannot do that under a jurisdictional analysis.
So, you know, the fact that—that there are

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

There are lots of border towns. And the

residents on both sides of the—of the line is really
insignificant.

The—the injury occurred in Nevada and

the question is, do we bring this Nevada corporation in
to Utah?
Again, the fact that there are common
shareholders of the—the Utah and the Nevada entities is

25

-I

really insignificant.

2

corporate barriers, the plaintiff has to get in, under

3

some kind of an alter ego or pierce the corporate veil

4

argument, hasn't made an kind of an argument along that

5

line, so common ownership is completely irrelevant and

g

immaterial.

j

In order to break down those

And finally, your Honor, this is not a foreign

Q

non-convenience argument or case.

g

case. Granted, there would be some inconvenience to

10
11
-I2
13

This is a jurisdiction

plaintiff in going to Elko to try this case.

Certainly,

there's some inconvenience to the State Line people,
including any employees who work out there who would be
witnesses in coming to Salt Lake to try this case.

14

But again, it's not a foreign non-convenience

15

issue, it's a jurisdiction issue and the jurisdictional

16

principles have to take precedence over the convenience

17

J of the parties.
THE COURT:

18

19
20
21
22
po
24
25

Thank you.

Let me state for the record that if it were
simply a question of wholly-owned subsidiary or common
shareholders or officers who live in Utah or employees
who live in Utah, that would not be enough to convey
jurisdiction.
I'm going to rule as well that advertising
alone is also insufficient to convey jurisdiction to this

26

-I | Court,
2 i

I am concerned, though, I think if post office

3

box is in Utah and there are options otherwise available,

4

telephone lines, faxes, if they were doing business in

5

Utah, that would be sufficient to give this Court

g

jurisdiction.

7

significant factual questions around those issues, I am

Q

going to set it for an evidentiary hearing on the

9

question of whether the State Line Casino does in fact do

Because there appears to be some

10

business within the State of Utah, take advantage of

11

doing business within the State of Utah, but that would

12
-I3

have to exceed advertising, having owners in common,

14

having employees or managers who live in the State,
that's—that's clearly not sufficient,

15

Jolene, can you hand me the scheduling book?

16

How soon, Counsel, are you going to be ready to

17

do—

18

MR. KATZ:

19

THE COURT:

20

Well—
— a short hearing on that

question?

21

MR. KATZ:

22

should be short; however, I do think we should be

23

entitled to limited discovery on that issue.

p4

25

I — I think the hearing

I mean, at

least a deposition of the manager and perhaps, you know,
some sort of 30(b)(6) designated representative of the

27

^6

-I

hotel-

I think—I think that's the bare minimum.

2

THE COURT:

3

need to do that?

Thirty days?

How long do you think you
Sixty days?

4

MR. KATZ:

5

days, so, split the difference between 30 and 60,

Q

I was going to say 45

THE COURT:

Is that agreeable, Ms,

Meyer?

7
8

I

MS. MEYER:

Sure.

9

I

THE COURT:

Okay.

We'll look to set

10

this hearing with the understanding that limited

11

discovery on the question of doing business within the

12 State of Utah not related to advertising or common
-jg I stockholders, but simply the question of whether they
14

15

exercise the privilege of doing business within the
State, discovery on that will cut off in 45 days.
That will put us to August 18th, the discovery

16
17

18

cut-off.

September; is that agreeable?
How long do you think you need?

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And hear this some time after, beginning of

A half an

hour?
MR. KATZ:
MS. MEYER:
MR. KATZ:

Oh, I think an hour.
I—
They7re going to put a

witness on, I'm sure.
MS. MEYER:

28

Well, you can put a

1

witness on.

I think it's your—your burden.
MR. KATZ:

2
3

Well, it may be my burden,

but are you going to put a witness on?

4

MS. MEYER:

5

MR. KATZ: Well, I guess you won't

6

know 'til I get here, then.

7
8

MS. MEYER:

Right.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. MEYER:

I think I'm fine on that,

How about

September 15th?

11
12

your Honor.

13

don't think I have a conflict.

I don't have my calendar with me, but I

MR. KATZ:

14
15

Certainly an

hour, your Honor.

9
10

Depends on what you do.

I—I'm open that day, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

18

MS. MEYER:

Uh huh.

19

THE COURT: And so that we avoid the

20

question of surprise, Mr. Katz, by the 18th of July, can

21

you designate whatever witness you're going to call for

22

that?

16
17

23
24
25

Set it at 11:00

o'clock then.

MR. KATZ:

I may not know until I do

that deposition, your Honor, and I mean, I—I've got a
pretty open calendar.

I'm sure I can get that deposition
29

scheduled, you know, like I say, a 30(b)(6) deposition in
the next couple weeks; but that could depend on who they
designate and various other issues.
MS. MEYER:

Your Honor, if it helps,

I don't—I don't care if he doesn't designate State Line
type witnesses until the end of this discovery period, as
long as I know w h o —
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. MEYER:

—he'll call on his own

side, so that I have some opportunity for some discovery
as well.
THE COURT:

By the 18th of July,

designate the non-State Line people so that she has the
chance—
MR. KATZ:

That, I can do.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Thank you,

Counsel.
MR. KATZ:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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ability constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5 t n
of December, 1997.
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NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY. UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4. 2001
STATE OF UTAH

24
25

(J

( S E A L )

31

Notary Public
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE

2 I STATE OF UTAH
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3 J COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
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ss.
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I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,

5

Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape

g

Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of

•j I Utah, do certify that I received an electronically
Q

recorded tape videotape of the within matter and caused

o

the same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the

10

foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 30, inclusive, to the

11

best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct

12
13

transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.

14

I do further certify that I am not counsel,

15

attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or

16

stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either

17

party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
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Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 10th
December, 1997.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

fM§DJS^&^feyS^
Third Judicial District

FEB 1 1 1998

STATE OF UTAH
3

-OOo-

4

By

S.Q

"^^3!5x

CHRIS BUDDENSICK,

Plaintiff,

5

Case No. 970900389 PI
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

6

STATE LINE HOTEL, INC., dba
STATE LINE HOTEL AND
CASINO, and DOES I-X,

7
8

(Vjcjeotfrpe

Proceedings)

Defendants.

9

-oOo-

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of

12

September, 1997, the above-entitled matter came on for

13

hearing before the HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting

14

as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of this

15

cause, and that the following videotape proceedings were

1G

had.

17

-oOo-

18

A P P E A R A N C E S

19
20

For the Plaintiff:

MICHAEL A. KATZ
Attorney at Law
Siegfried & Jensen
5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah
84123

For the Defendants:

CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
Attorney at Law
Morgan & Hansen
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
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1 I

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3 I
4

THE COURT:

970900389, Buddensick v s . State Line,
Counsel, if y o u / d make an appearance so the

5
g

record's complete?

7
g

MR. KATZ:

Michael Katz, appearing on

behalf of the plaintiff, your Honor,

g
10

— h e r e in Case No,

M S . MEYER:

Cynthia Meyer on belialf

THE COURT:

Okay.

of the defendants.

-J-J I

This is a

-12

continuation from a hearing several weeks ago, a month

<I3

ago, relating to the question of whether the Court had

14 | jurisdiction over a slip and fall at the casino in
^g I Wendover.
16
]j

Okay.
Counsel, who wants t o — M r . Katz?
MR. KATZ:

Thank you, your Honor.

18

just asked Cindy w h o really (inaudible) and she said I

19

did and so I'll accept that burden, your Honor.

20
21
22
23
24
25

I

I — I assume you have received our supplemental
memorandum and that submitted by the defendant.
THE COURT:

I have and I've reviewed

it, although I have not looked at all the exhibits, but I
accept your representation of what they were.
MR. KATZ:

Thank you.

And they are

1

j rather lengthy, your Honor, so I — I

tried to summarize

2 i them at least in some fashion.
3 I

THE COURT:

4

down towards you?

5

you.

Okay.

I think that camera will switch to

Go ahead.

g I
7

Would you push that mike

MR. KATZ:
I—I

Thank you, your Honor.

think fairly characterized, the exhibits

g

and answers to interrogatories that were uncovered during

g

the discovery phase of this case show clearly that the

10

defendant conducts a substantial and important and

11

significant amount of business in the State of Utah, and

12

that that business, although largely unrelated to the

13

cause of action that is the subject of this lawsuit, that

14

being a slip and fall, is more than ample for this Court

15

to exercise a general jurisdiction over the defendant.

16

And I think t h e — t h e allegations of specific

17

jurisdiction were largely covered by the original

18

memorandum, so I would like to focus my comments on the

19

general jurisdictional claims that we believe arise from

20

the evidence produced during discovery.

21
22
23
24
25

That evidence shows that in addition to
advertising, sales and promotional-type activities that
we relied upon during the initial filing, that here, the
defendant, by and through various subsidiaries—and I
won't go into these ownership issues that t h e — t h a t the

-I

Court wanted us to—to avoid—but nonetheless, the

2

documents produced show that defendant, State Line Hotel

3

leases no less than six parcels of real property in the

4

State of Utah from either State Line Properties, Ltd., or

5

S t a t e L i n e P r o p e r t i e s , I n c . , b o t h of w h i c h a r e U t a h
entities.

7 I

So, they've got agreements with Utah

entities

g

a s t o t h o s e p i e c e s of p r o p e r t y , b u t m o r e

g

they occupy and possess that property under these leases.

10

importantly,

They also have property under lease with the

^

C i t y of W e n d o v e r a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , a l t h o u g h t h e y

-12

own that property,

13

of s u b s i d i a r y c o r p o r a t i o n s , I — I find it f r a n k l y a

14

little—a

15

t h e y w o u l d b e s u r p r i s e d t o b e h a i l e d into c o u r t in t h e

16

State of Utah.

17

I

if w e a v o i d t h i s — t h i s

don't

fuzzy gray

little silly for the defendant to claim

line

that

If there was a dispute about any of those

18

leases, about the ownership of the underlying property,

19

those claims would have to be litigated in Utah. A

20

Nevada court wouldn't have any jurisdiction over them

21

because it involves real estate located in the State of

22

Utah.

23

business in the State of Utah.

24
25

We think that shows the transaction of substantial

In addition, your Honor, documents disclosed by
the defendant shows that they have contracts with Utah

1

companies.

2

exhibited with our memorandum, they have a contract with

3

American Linen and they service—they service the

4

businesses out there.

5

In addition to all of those leases that we

Furthermore, they contract for cash register

6

services out there, as I understand one of the other

7

documents they produced.

8
g

And finally, we have an insurance policy that
I not only covers State Line Hotel as the primary insured,

10

it lists a number of other entities which are Utah

-I1 I entities, we know that from other materials, but it also
12

13 J

shows a big long list of Utah properties.
And frankly, we did not depose any of the
officers to find out whether those were the same

^5 I properties that are the subject of the lease, some may
16

be, some may not be; the fact is, substantial,

17

significant business in the State of Utah.

18

I think it's kind of funny that the leases were

19

also drafted by attorneys in the State of Utah,

20

specifically it looked to me like Van Cott, Bagley,

21

Cornwall & McCarthy; that signatures were notarized by
Utah notaries and—and your Honor—and let me represent

22
23

me to you that I'm not only referring to the exhibits

24

attached to our memorandum, but other leases that were

25

produced covering Nevada properties were also drafted and

notarized by Utah entities.
We also know from the answers to
interrogatories, that in fact, State Line has been hailed
into Court in Utah in at least two other cases in the
recent past, so they shouldn't be surprised by these
proceedings.
And I suppose one thing that kind of bothered
me was some statements made by defendants during their
initial filings, and I'd like to specifically refer to
the affidavit of Mr. Perry.
And it states the following:

State Line Hotel

was incorporated in the 1950's in the State of Nevada.
By the way, those articles of incorporation were executed
in Utah.
And it owns property in Nevada and not in any
state.

Well, I suppose that's accurate, your Honor.

it sure leases a heck of a lot of property in Utah.

But
And

specifically, it does not own any property in Utah, it
does own property in Wendover; it leases property in
Utah, your Honor.
And then it goes on to state that the business
of the State Line Hotel, Inc., is to operate the State
Line Hotel and Casino.

Other than advertising and

promotion of its Nevada hotel and casino, State Line
Hotel, it does no business in Utah or neighboring states.

/

1

Your Honor, I humbly submit that that is a

2

flat-out misrepresentation.

3

and it does other business in Utah including business

4

with attorneys in Utah, business with linen supply and

5

nation—and cash register companies in Utah.

g

false.

7

significant business here.

g
g
10

It leases properties in Utah

This is

They lease property here, they conduct

One thing I wanted to say in closing, your
Honor, is the cases that have been relied upon by both
the plaintiff and defendant are really very different

11 than our case and there's a unique aspect and
^2 I circumstance of our case, which I think is an underlying
13

current of what's gone on here.
Bradford vs. Nagelr for instance, involves a

14
15

Mississippi resident and a Utah corporation, and then we

16 have all those advertising cases that were relied upon in
-17 I our opening memorandum because we were talking about
.jg

advertising activities.

ig

injured at a—a Florida Walt Disney World or something

20

like that.
What we have here is a Nevada corporation that

21
22
23
24
25

A Pennsylvania resident gets

owns a borderline state casino, it owns the property on
the Nevada side, leases a bunch of property on the Utah
side.
I don't think anybody would dispute the fact

that the vast bulk of its customers, clients, business is
solicited from Utah and comes from Utah.

It has numerous

business entanglements with Utah entities, including
wholly-owned subsidiaries; it transacts a ton of business
here and should not be shocked, in fact, it should
totally expect to be sued in Utah courts, including for
claims such as the slip and fall, which is at issue in
this case.
On that basis, your Honor, we think the motion
to dismiss should be denied and there are ample reasons
and justifications for the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over this defendant.
THE COURT:

Just as an aside,

assuming the Court has jurisdiction, is the venue
properly here or i n —
MR. KATZ:
THE COURT:
MR. KATZ:
your Honor.

Well—
Where?
—that's a good question,

I think venue—it's arguable that —that

because all of this property is in Tooele County, the
leasing—excuse me, the leases are in Tooele County, in
fact, they were recorded with the Tooele County Recorder,
I note on a number of the documents, I think venue gets
into a lot of convenience issues.
And in fact, actually the jurisdiction raises

8

/J

convenience issues, too, and—and a couple of the courts,
the decisions mention that.
When you look at convenience, I think you
really want to—to keep the case in Salt Lake County, and
let me—let me explain why.

Most of the witnesses,

particularly the fact witnesses, were other customers at
the casino.

They're all from Salt Lake County, and we

know that from the accident reports that were provided.
The plaintiff is from Salt Lake County.

The

defendant, it looks like most of their corporate officers
are located in Salt Lake County—maybe not most, but at
least some of them to the extent we may need to do like a
36(b) type deposition, they're mostly in Utah.
And I think importantly, most of the doctors
who treated the plaintiff are located in Salt Lake County
as well.

So, I—I think that's—that's a legitimate

reason to—to keep things in Salt Lake County.
Thank you very much, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Ms. Meyer?

MS. MEYER:

Thank you, your Honor.

This was set for an evidentiary hearing and the
plaintiff chose to call no witnesses at this time, and so
we responded.
As the Court knows, this is a personal injury
case that occurred on premises.

It's a premises

Q

1

liability case.

The plaintiff's injuries and cause of

2

action don't arise out of any of the State Line's

3

contacts with Utah and I think that plaintiff is

4 j essentially, although maybe not completely, conceding
that.
g I

And even in this case, if the plaintiff went to

7

Nevada to gamble in response to advertising, there's

g

still not a connection between the advertising and the

g

injury, because that depends on something else.

10

y°u

«H

t h e i r — t h e i r property in a reasonably safe manner.

12

know

It's,

/ whether or not the defendants were maintaining

Your Honor, t h e — t h e cases that were relied on

13

by plaintiff in this last brief a r e — a r e indeed very

14

different from the situation that we have here.

.j5

cases that were relied on, t h e — t h e — o h , I can't remember

16

the name of the one, Rocka-Vaughn or something like that,

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The

in the last memo, and the Bradford v s . Naael. involved
contracts between residents and non-residents, and then
breach of contract and related causes of action arising
out of those contracts.
The entire analysis in both of the cases was
under the (inaudible) statute and in this case, there is
only jurisdiction if i t — i f there is general
jurisdiction; so those cases really don't apply.
But I do disagree with the statements that most

10

1

of the cases that have been relied on are really

2

different from this case.

3

that are similar and those are the cases involving

4

really, the resort destination type of places; you know,

5

some of the Disney cases did deal mostly with advertising

5

a n d — a n d we're past that issue now.

j

There are some cases t h a t —

But one of the cases that we cited earlier in

3

either our main memorandum or our reply for the June

g

hearing is the case called Nunley v s . Second District

10

Court.

That involved the Lake T a h o e —

^

THE COURT:

Is that the O r e g o n —

12

MS. MEYER:

No.

13

That was Circus

I Circu? V?t PQpq, I think,

14

THE COURT:

Okay,

15

MS. MEYER:

The Nunley v s . Second

^g j District Court is the Lake Tahoe ski area where the
•j7

Nevada resident goes to the California side, skis at Lake

18

Tahoe, is injured, sues in Nevada and the Court says, no,

19

there's not enough here for general jurisdiction, even

20

though t h e — t h e ski resort itself, I think it was called

21

North Star, has been a continuous member of the Reno-

22

Sparks, Nevada Chamber of Commerce for many years and

23

advertises here and sends brochures to sports stores and

24

everything else.

25

Even though there has been that

continuous membership of the Chamber of Commerce, that's

11

not enough for general jurisdiction and it didn't arise
out of any of the contacts with Utah.
Plaintiff says, well, yeah, but they own prop—
or they lease property in Utah.

Yeah.

There are a few

isolated parcels in Wendover, Utah, where they do lease
some property and certainly, I think the State Line
would—would expect to go to Court in Utah if they didn't
pay rent or if there was some kind of a landlord-tenant
dispute.

Of course, they would expect, but that again

arises under specific personal jurisdiction, it arises
under the long-arm statute.
That doesn't mean that because they may expect
to go to Court over the lease itself, that they would
expect to go to Court in Utah over a personal injury that
occurred on their facility in Nevada.
And—and what we've learned in this discovery
is that there are isolated and transitory relationships.
The State Line does not do business in Utah.

There are

contacts, to be sure; but it's business is operating a
casino.

I mean, that's a Nevada-type of business.

That's the type of business that can't even be conducted
in Utah.
And to say that—that leasing a piece of
property or contracting with American Linen to take care
of the paper towel needs or the cloth towel needs as
12

^

doing business is—is stretching what is meant under the
jurisdiction case law.
That doing business means actually conducting
business.

This isn't Albertson's.

This isn't an Idaho

grocery store chain that has 20 grocery stores in the
Salt Lake Valley.

This isn't the Holiday Inn that has

800 hotels.
THE COURT: Assuming it is
Albertson's, somebody gets hurt in a store in Boise. Can
they sue here?
MS. MEYER:

Well, possibly.

THE COURT: Aren't there—aren't
there enough stores here that the general jurisdiction—
MS. MEYER:
jurisdiction here?

That—that may be general

So, because—if you do have a Utah

resident, they may well be able to sue here; but we don't
have that situation with the State Line. The State Line
has its single business on the Nevada side in Wendover,
even though they have some contacts.

I have contacts

with other states; I mean virtually all of us do.
THE COURT: Okay.

But that—if

they're leasing property in Utah, isn't that—
MS. MEYER:

I don't think so, your

THE COURT:

Isn't that—

Honor.

13

C

-2.

1
2

They're leasing

THE COURT:

That's not even in

property—

3
4

MS. MEYER:

general, that's obviously a part of their business.
MS. MEYER:

5

Well, certainly when it's

g

t h e — t h e parking lot, you bet it's part of their business

7

and if someone got injured on the parking lot, they'd be

3

really hard-pressed to say that they couldn't sue in Utah

g

if they were on the Utah side when they got injured; but

10

they're not owning property in Utah.
And the case law that discusses these various

11

-I2 I factors talks about ownership of property.

It talks

-I3

about a stronger presence than merely leasing property.

14

It talks about a stronger presence than having even a
sales force in the foreign state.

1g I
17

Remember t h e — t h e case with the big long German
name.

They talked about more contact than that and the

18

jurisprudence, you know, talks about substantial and

19

continuous local activity as opposed to activity that is

20

limited in nature and transitory in duration.

21
22
23
24
25

And what we have here is very limited types of
contacts with the State of Utah.
in duration.

And it's also limited

You look at the contracts, like the

American Linen contract, which is a 1996 contract, by the
way, and you know, I think those contracts are usually

14

1

limited by a year period and then, you know, perhaps

2

they're renewed, if the parties are satisfied.

3

THE COURT:

If we kept the case here,

4

would we end up with applying Nevada law to the question

5

of duty?

6

MS. MEYER:

Well, I would think so.

7

I t ' s — i t ' s a Nevada premises case and so I — I

3

t h a t — t h a t that would very much come into play, where we

g

have an injury on Nevada premises.

10 j

And is that substantially

different or is t h a t —

11
12

THE COURT:

would think

I

MS. MEYER:

Well, I don't know to

13

tell you the truth.

I don't know.

I—I

doubt that it's

14

substantially different, you know, i t ' s — i t ' s personal

15

injury law.
Plaintiff—plaintiff's counsel accuses the

«I7 I State Line o f — o f telling falsities i n — i n
18

19
20

connection

with this motion and I — a n d I think that that's going a
little bit overboard.
When we say, we don't do business in Utah or

21

the neighboring states, we're talking about the hotel and

22

casino business and that's not done in other states.

23

Yes, there are contacts, we've always conceded there were

24

contacts in the very same affidavits the plaintiff has

25

pointed to, to say that we're telling the falsehoods.

15

-I

W e ' r e s a y i n g , y e a h , w e h a v e other c o n t a c t s , y e a h ,

2

had c o n t a c t s w i t h , you k n o w , w e — w e

3

s e r v i c e s in S a l t L a k e , w e o b t a i n e d some g o o d s in Salt

obtained

we've

some

4 J L a k e , w e o b t a i n e d s e r v i c e s and g o o d s in o t h e r s t a t e s

as

well.
g I

A n d if y o u look at the e n t i r e

interrogatory

7

a n s w e r s w h i c h w e a t t a c h e d to our s u p p l e m e n t a l

g

w h i c h w a s h a n d - d e l i v e r e d o v e r on F r i d a y , t h e r e ' s a list,

g

long list of c o n t r a c t s ; in fact, I t h i n k t h e r e a r e 28

10

contracts listed and plaintiff pulls two, the

memorandum,

American

H

I L i n e n and t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r s e r v i c e from S a l t L a k e .

12

T h e r e a r e m a n y m o r e leases of

13

There's—there's

property.

s e v e r a l p a r c e l s owned by S t a t e

Line

H o t e l in N e v a d a , s e v e r a l o t h e r p a r c e l s o w n e d b y t h e

State

15 J L i n e P r o p e r t i e s , t h e U t a h entity, in U t a h ; b u t y o u k n o w ,
1g

w e ' r e o n l y p i c k i n g a few a n d — a n d

17

t h e s e , and I s u p p o s e t h a t ' s a p p r o p r i a t e , b u t t o say t h a t

12

w e ' r e t e l l i n g f a l s e h o o d s about w h e r e w e ' r e d o i n g

19

is—is

20

saying, looking

Y o u r H o n o r , just i n — i n

summary, I — I

t h i n k t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f has met t h e b u r d e n of

22

t h a t t h e S t a t e L i n e h a s a s u b s t a n t i a l and

23

a c t i v i t y in U t a h .

25

business

just n o t t r u e and it's not f a i r .

21

24

at

l i m i t e d in n a t u r e , it's limited in d u r a t i o n and

16

proving

continuous

T h e r e is isolated a c t i v i t y ,

not e n o u g h f o r g e n e r a l p e r s o n a l

don't

jurisdiction.

it's
that's

1 |

Certainly, in certain circumstances, it would

2

be enough for specific personal jurisdiction, but we

3

don't have that situation here.

4

the Court dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and

5

plaintiff can then re-file if she so chooses.

6

THE COURT:

So, we would ask that

You indicated, Counsel,

7

that one of the parcels was—that they lease in Utah was

3

a parking lot. Are the other parcels of similar kinds of

g

things or are they used for offices o r —
MS. MEYER:

10

^

they are.

«I2

do have a list of what they are.

Let—let me tell you what

I don't know what they're all used for, but I

Of the—the leases that were identified by

13

<I4

plaintiff in the supplemental memorandum, Exhibit B, and

15

I'm not sure what it—what it was, was not entered into

16
17

until about a year after plaintiff's fall, so I didn't
find out what it even was.
Exhibit C is a lease for a duplex in Wendover,

18
19

Utah.

20

in Wendover, Utah.

21

property.

22

Exhibit F is an eight-tenths of an acre lot in Utah and

23

it's used for parking lot, parking structure and the—the

24
25

Exhibit D is a lease for two warehouse buildings
Exhibit E is the parking lot

Exhibit—I'm sorry for rattling papers—

cowboy sign.

I don't know if you're familiar with that.

And Exhibit G is a lease for storage space out at the old

17

1

Decker Field, just some storage units that they have out

2

there at the old Air Force facility, which the City of

3

Wendover now owns.

4

That's it.

There's, you know, the parking lot property

5

certainly would be connected.

I don't know if the others

g

are connected with the business or not, but they're

7 l really fairly minor properties all in—in the locale, in
g

Wendover, just on the Utah side.

9

property, in other words, in Orem or Provo or St. George

<IQ

They're not leasing

or other places, other than right there by their

^ i business.
12

I

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Katz?

13

MR. KATZ:

14
15 Honor.
-jg I
17

Okay.

Just a couple things, your

Number one, in terms of continuous versus

transitory, the articles of incorporation which were

18

entered into in Utah, signed in Utah, notarized in Utah,

19

were adopted in 1950. That's 47 years of activity in

20

Utah.
I pulled one of the leases.

21
22
23
24
25

This is Exhibit—

sorry, your Honor—Exhibit F, for instance.
lease.

A 20-year

That's—that's pretty continuous, your Honor.
And the properties, themselves.

A parking

structure for the casino, a sign for the casino, that's
18

1 I pretty darn closely-related to its casino business, your
2 i Honor,
3 I

I think we've met our burden.

It—it—it—

4

there's—there's a lot there, there is. They send their

5

initial filing, that State Line Properties, Inc. owns a

6

half-acre parcel of real property.

7

That's all.

They—

j they were—they admitted a half-acre parcel of property;

3

sorry, I count a minimum of six.

9
1Q

This is—this is plenty.
on that basis, your Honor.

-I-I

Thank you,

THE COURT: Okay.
Ms

-12
13

I'm—I'll submit it

* MEYER:

Your Honor, may I clarify

one thing?

14 j

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

15

MS. MEYER:

The affidavit that's

16
17

being referred to as the initial filing was not filed in

18

the entity that's being identified as owning a half-acre

19

parcel of property in Wendover, Utah, is state Line

20

Properties, Inc.

21

with at a l l —

this case, it was filed in another case; but that aside,

It's not the entity that we're dealing

22

THE COURT:

I understand that.

23

MS. MEYER:

— s o I think it's

24
25

irrelevant.
THE COURT: And I think Mr. Katz

19

-I

understood that, too,

2

MR. KATZ:

I—I did, your Honor.

I

3

didn't mean to imply that it was the State Line Hotel.

4

No, I knew it was State Line Properties.

5

THE COURT:

g

I'm going to grant the

motion to dismiss.

7

Let me state for the record that I don't

3

believe it is a foreign non-convenience proper—problem,

9

like Mr. Katz has made very clear that convenience of

10

participants, that the litigating firms, that the

-j-I

principals, all have plenty of contact with Utah such

12

that it may in fact be the most convenient place to try

13

J the case.

So, it's clearly not a foreign non-convenient

kind of an issue,

14
15 I

But I think it's a close call whether the

16

leasing of parcels of property in Utah, and I'm going to

17

find for the record, it's sufficiently continuous that

18

the continuity is not the issue either.

That the parking

19

J lot, the sign, I think clearly have been there, the

2Q

| contemplation is that they will continue to be there for

2-| j an extended period of time, those are directly related to
22
23

the casino business.

24

or a warehouse that may change, that would be more

25

tenuous; but I,m not even relying on those.

If it were simply storage space at the airport

20

1

I think the leasing of incidental parcels, and

2

in that, I am including the signage and the parking

3

structure and the parking lot. While those are clearly

4

directly related to the carrying on of a casino business,

5

they're not integral in the sense that the casino could

g

not, in some fashion or another, continue*

7

The leasing of those parcels is insufficient to

g

convey general jurisdiction such that the defendants are

g

liable for all of their actions to any Utah plaintiff in

10 a Utah court.
11 I
Certainly, if one of the leased parcels was the
12

13

sight of the slip and fall, that would be sufficient; but
I guess I'm just troubled by a slip and fall occurring in

14 Nevada, resulting in jurisdiction in Utah when there is
15 I not a generalized presence in Utah.
1g

I tried to make that sufficiently clear, Mr.

17 | Katz, that you can take it up for simplified review
12 I without a great deal of expenditure of funds to do that,
19

and find out if I'm correct or not.

I certainly have

20

enough question in my own mind that I'm not sure that

21

you're not going to get a reversal on that; but for the

22

record, are there things that you want clarified, so that

23

you can bring up a simple record to the Appeals Court?

24

MR. KATZ:

25

questions about it, we can—we can get it off the

21

I think if there were any

transcript.

I can't think of any major points raised

that you didn't address, although we did mention the
advertising, solicitation.
THE COURT:

And as I indicated at the

last hearing, I don't think the advertisement and
solicitation by itself are sufficient to get that
generalized jurisdiction.
And without evidence showing that she was
following up on one of those trips or other things that
they plan and that they market, the ties are
insufficient.
Ms. Meyer, anything that you want on the
record?
MS. MEYER:

No.

Nothing, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ms. Meyer, if

you'll draw the order and the findings then, submit that
to Mr. Katz for approval as to form.
MS. MEYER:

I will, your Honor.

Can

we—will you require findings, or will the findings on
the record be sufficient?
THE COURT:

I think for purposes of

making sure that Mr. Katz has the right to take it
clearly to the Court of Appeal, we ought to put it in a
set of findings.
MS. MEYER:

Okay.

22

i

THE COURT:

So that they d o n ' t

2 I to t r a n s c r i b e that to p r e s e n t the i s s u e .

I would

have
think

3 I that it could be d o n e fairly simply and t h e C o u r t of
4 I A p p e a l s c a n s i m p l y issue a r u l i n g that I'm e i t h e r out t o
lunch or I'm
g I

Okay.

7
g

11 I
12

Anything

else?

MR. KATZ:

THE COURT:
Counsel.

Okay.

Thank you,

C o u r t w i l l b e in r e c e s s .
MS. MEYER:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, this hearing was

13
14

Nothing I can think of,

your Honor.

g

10

close.

* * *

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

23

concluded.)
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Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
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received an electronically recorded videotape of the
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed
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Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
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I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,

5

Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape

6

Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of

7

Utah, do certify that I received an electronically

8

recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the

9

same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the

10
11
12
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14

foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 23, inclusive, to the
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,

15

attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or

16

stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either

17

party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.

18
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19
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
A k t COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS BUDDENSICK,

DEFENDANT'S RESPO>bL TO
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONTO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATELINE CASINO, INC., dba
STATELINE HOTEL AND CASINO,
and DOES I-X,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9709003891PI

Judse William A. Thorne

Defendant 'M.itc ' >nc H^t^i ITK.. hv and tiiu'iigh its attorneys of record, submits
the following responsive memorandum to Plaintiffs September 11, 1997, Supplemental
.\\-n>-~>.'

-

' • .Tt'<-

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
RESPONSE I P LNDISPL ILi? i \CTS

(d) Exhibit E to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum is for a parking lot in
Wendover, Utah.
(e) Exhibit F to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum is for a 0.8 acre lot in
Wendover, Utah, with monthly rental ranging from $1,200 to S2,500 per month
over the life of the lease. The lot is leased for a parking lot, parking structure and
business sign.
(f) Exhibit G to Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum is a lease with the City of
Wendover for storage space at Decker Field in Wendover, Utah, for S100 per
month.
3. The fact that an insurance policy insures related entities is irrelevant to the
determination whether this court has personal jurisdiction over the Nevada entity, State Line
Hotel, Inc., in this action.
4. Defendant's answers to interrogatories notes only two Utah post office boxes.
The other post office box noted in the answers is at the new Wendover, Nevada, post office, as
indicated during the June 30, 1997, hearing. In addition, the only way to contact the facility at
which Plaintiff was allegedly injured, is by calling a Nevada telephone number. Importantly, in
Interrogatory No. 3, Plaintiff again does not limit her question to the time of the accident, but
only asks about addresses and telephone numbers in the last five years which includes the present

3

time. It is irrelevant that the Utah entities, State Line Properties, '

rv. ' td, used a Utah post

office box.
5. Plaintiffs statements that "[n]early every agreement entered into by the
Defendant, including the leases and contracts noted above, show they were executed and
notarized in Salt Laki i"n\ i lab" and that they were drafted by Utah attorneys, is terribly
misleading (if not downright false):
•Exhibit A (the American Linen contract and Retail Control Systems invoice) do
not mdiente where they were executed or who drafted them.
•Exhibit B is the only document which indicates that it was executed in Salt Lake
C lty and drafted by Salt Lake City attorneys.
•Exhibit C does not indicate where it was executed or who drafted it.
•Exhibit D does not indicate where it was executed or who drafted it.
•Exhibit F was notarized hv a Nevada notary (unclear as to where it was executed)
and otherwise does not indicated who drafted it.
•Exhibit F was signed and notarized in Nevada.
•Exhibit G does not indicate wlitTr it n as executed i «i v\ ho dratted it but does
indicate that it is made and construed under the laws of Utah.
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